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Abstract 
 European Air Traffic Control is extremely safe. The drawback to this safety 
record is that it is very difficult to estimate what the ‘underlying’ accident rate for mid-air 
collisions is now, or to detect any changes over time. The aim is to see if it possible to 
construct simple ATC safety indicators that correlate with this underlying accident rate. A 
perfect indicator would be simple to comprehend and capable of being calculated by a 
checklist process. An important concept is that of ‘system control’: the ability to 
determine the outcome against reasonably foreseen changes and variations of system 
parameters. A promising indicator is ‘Incident Not Resolved by ATC’, INRA, incidents 
in which the ground ATC defences have been ‘used up’. The key question is: if someone 
says he or she knows how to make a good estimate of the underlying accident rate, then 
how could this claim be tested? If it correlates very well with INRA, then what would be 
the argument for saying that it is a better indicator? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Should Europe’s airspace be safe? Should politicians keep their promises about 
improving European aviation safety? Some questions obviously need the answer ‘Yes’. 
But is it actually feasible for the air transport industry to demonstrate that European air 
traffic control (ATC) systems are safe? The European Union (EU) legislation setting up 
the Single European Sky states:  
“Smooth operation of the air transport system requires a consistent, high level of 
safety in air navigation services allowing optimum use of Europe's airspace and a 
consistent, high level of safety in air travel…” 
The aim here is to see if it possible to construct good ATC safety indicators.  
 
The real problem – a very good problem to have – is that modern ATC systems in 
developed countries have very few accidents, of which a small fraction are mid-air 
collisions. Thus, attention has to focus on ‘incidents’ – safety occurrences somehow 
‘near’ to accidents. Unfortunately, there are very many different kinds of incidents; and is 
it not always obvious which incidents are ‘near’ to accidents, for example see Spouge and 
Perrin (2005).  
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It is incredibly difficult to be confident that one understands the mechanisms that 
relate incidents to accidents. So what confidence can there be that an indicator is giving 
the ‘right’ answers? Confident predictions require strong evidence about the causation 
and measured frequency characteristics of that kind of event. This argues for as few 
assumptions to be made as possible, and for calculations that do not require arbitrary or 
judgemental assumptions.  
 
The concern is not with the present, or rather recent history, but with what 
information such incidents convey about the risks inherent in the system, so as to enable 
predictions to be made about the future. How can incident information – supplemented by 
what other knowledge? – somehow be processed in a way that provides estimates of 
future system risk. Put bluntly: “What are the odds of a mid-air collision next year?” 
 
 For present purposes, the analysis is restricted to en route ATC, i.e. not including 
accidents operating at airports, and the focus is on mid-air collisions, but recognising that 
(e.g.) accidents on runways and taxiways can be equally catastrophic. This excludes, for 
example, accidents occurring if controllers were to provide incorrect information about 
severe weather conditions. Airborne accidents arising from e.g. terrorism or hijacking, i.e. 
where there is some intention to cause an accident, are also not covered.  
 
 
2. ATC Safety Indicators: Purpose 
 Safety here will be taken to relate to the rate of mid-air collisions occurring over a 
given period. Usually, this period covers tens of millions of aircraft flight hours while 
under the supervision of controllers, during a particular year for the country or region in 
question. ‘Safe’ is usually a statement that this rate is less than some declared safety 
target (e.g. see Brooker, 2004).  
 
Safety indicators are of two types: if safety targets are being met this year – 
absolute indicator; if safety is improving or not, year by year – relative indicator. The first 
is much more desirable – but also much more difficult.  
A safety indicator must tell us about system performance. It should enable us to 
predict the future frequency of critical system failures. A perfect indicator should be:  
simple to comprehend; 
capable of being calculated by a checklist process; 
‘obvious’, in the sense that people would agree that it was a sensible thing to 
measure – what the psychologists call ‘face validity’; and 
not require complex modelling calculations to be carried out in order to ‘weight’ 
the data appropriately 
The quality of the prediction does not have to attain perfection, but it needs to be reliable 
in a statistical sense. A perfect indicator would consistently match the pattern of actual 
changes. A useful indicator might match the underlying patterns changes 80% of the time 
and fail to match 20% of the time. 
 
Suppose that a collision could only be caused by one particular set of 
circumstances. Suppose also that near-collisions were a well-defined category that 
described events that could only happen in a finite limited number (N – 1) of occasions 
per collision. This would correspond to the picture in Figure 1. A collision is the dark 
hexagon, a near-collision is a lighter shaded hexagon, and all the situations with no risk 
are empty hexagons. In reality, there are an enormous number of empty hexagons, 
extending in all directions, because collisions and near collisions are rare.  
 
Figure 1. Idealised Accident/Incident Model – see text for explanation 
 
Suppose that the probability of an event is represented simply by the number of 
hexagons, and that all hexagons, empty, shaded or dark, are equally likely to happen. This 
occurs in reality if impaired performance were caused by a single (detectable) failure in a 
piece of doubly redundant equipment, and total failure by an independently occurring 
second failure of this equipment.  
 
Leaving statistical variations aside for the moment, and with ‘near collisions’ 
including any actual collisions, the picture says: 
 Rate of collisions  
Rate of collisions = ────────────── x  Rate of near collisions 
 Rate of near collisions  
Or: 
 1  
Rate of collisions = ── x  Rate of near collisions 
 N  
So if collisions are not observed during some time period, their rate can be estimated by 
scaling down the rate of observed near collisions by the factor N. The three key elements 
for this to work satisfactorily are: that near collisions can be identified; that they are of 
equal value in predicting the collision rate, i.e. there is a single factor for doing this 
scaling; and that the size of this factor is in principle knowable. Unfortunately, this nice 
mental model is a wholly inadequate description of ATC incidents and accidents.  
 
 3. ATC Incident and Collision Equation 
Figure 2 shows a basic ATC Incident and Collision Model equation to calculate 
the collision risk CE in State E. As stressed in the figure, CE is actually an abstraction, 
because collisions are so rare. The equation is necessarily true, simply because the 
definitions interlock, but if assessed over a finite time period, NES and FES in particular 
will be subject to considerable statistical variations.  
 
 
Figure 2. ATC Incident and Collision Model, plus a selection of issues 
 
Every term in the CE equation has definitional and computational problems, as 
shown by the issues listed at the bottom of the Figure. A different formulation of this 
equation could not eliminate such problems, because they are intrinsic to the estimation 
process. If the parameters in the equation are known, then it is possible to compare the 
estimated collision risk, and hence en route safety, across States (see discussion in 
Brooker (2007b).  
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 Safety targets place a maximum value on CE across all States. But CE is not 
directly measurable – ATC is extremely safe. FES, the scaling Factor of Collisions to 
{Severity ≥ S} incidents for State E, is very difficult to estimate for general ATC 
situations, as distinct from special ATC subsystems. The temptation is to assume that it 
has about the same value across States, but this would be no more than an assumption 
about an unknown function.  
 
There has to be some specific value or consistent assessment corresponding to the 
severity S. Without a bottom limit, then, in theory, controllers and pilots could report all 
incidents, even those with minuscule safety impact – which in reality would probably 
tend to lead to massive under-reporting. There are good arguments for taking S values of 
high severity (Brooker, 2007a). The basic idea is that mid-air collisions will be most 
highly correlated with the occurrence of events which are closest in nature to collisions, 
and much less correlated with initiating precursor events. A non-safety analogy is scoring 
goals in football matches: goals scored will be better predicted by the number of shots at 
goal rather than the amount of possession of the ball. 
 
Eurocontrol has recognised that there are serious problems with severity 
assessment, even when examined by genuinely expert groups. But what is an incident – 
or a severe incident? Traditionally, the severity of an observed event is defined by its 
‘degree of risk’ – but this replaces one abstraction with another. Often, assessments are 
made by an expert group – so how is consistency to be assured between States and over 
time? The Netherlands safety experts, de Jong and van Es, recently commented: 
“…a uniformly applied severity classification for air traffic occurrences in Europe 
appears unfeasible. There are too many different views, ideas and desires to make 
this possible…it is questionable whether these [proposed classifications] are going 
to work…”  
Incidents are not always reliably reported, let alone sufficiently investigated, so severity 
is therefore often not classified, and there is not even consistency when just one severity 
classification scheme is used. 
 
A critical problem is with the parameter RES. In 2006, the Eurocontrol 
Performance Review Commission (PRC) expressed concern that collection and 
communication of safety information Europe-wide is currently restricted by the 
publication and confidentiality policies. In the PRC’s view: “Achieved levels of safety 
and their trends remain opaque”.  
 
 
4. ATC System Defences 
ATC does not fail because of an evil opponent. All the controllers and pilots are 
on the same safety-enhancing team. Incidents and accidents occur because people are 
fallible :incidents and accidents are in essence ‘own goals’. Everyone makes mistakes, 
fails to remember some things, sometimes mis-estimates what is likely to happen, etc. 
Controllers and pilots are carefully selected and trained for their jobs, but still make these 
kinds of errors – albeit at a very low frequency. ‘System control’ covers all the means by 
which the system is defended against potential negative and serious consequences of 
‘own goals’. As system control is rarely lost in practice, the proportion of time that the 
ATC system is under threat from even these ‘root cause’ precursor events is very low (for 
a discussion, see Corcoran (2004)).  
 
ATC has highly structured processes and safety defences. Figure 3 is a simplified 
version of the control processes ensuring safety, in reality there is a very complex set of 
probabilistic feedbacks and interactions. Explanations of separation minimum, STCA 
(Short Term Conflict Alert) and ACAS (Airborne Collision Avoidance System) can 
found in Brooker (2005a) and its references; the symbols  and  are covered in a later 
section. The existence of STCA – plus help from colleagues – means that the controller is 
warned about potential separation breaches, even if he or she does not notice them. Note 
that a separation breach can occur because the pilot deviates from the safe plan; or when 
the safe plan was not in fact safe, in terms of the required minimum separation between 
aircraft. The existence of ACAS means that the pilot is warned about possible collisions, 
and told what ascent or descent flightpath should remove the risk.  
 
Note that these defences allow for error corrections to be carried out before any 
separation is breached, i.e. the error would not be detected just from records of separation 
breaches alone. Remedial action in the ATC system is therefore diverse and in depth. 
Complex combinations have been observed in UK airspace, from an examination of 
Airproxes (Brooker, 2005; UKAB, 2006).  
 
 
5. Closest Point of Approach Modelling 
To reiterate, the ATC Safety Indicator problem is that of estimating the frequency 
of (almost completely) non-observed catastrophic occurrences from the frequency of 
related observed occurrences. Good predictions necessarily rely on regularity and 
consistent patterns.  
 
A key question to ask is: “If things are the same next year, will there be an 
accident?” But they will not be the same next year. If one could be sure that things would 
be exactly the same, then there would obviously be no accidents next year. But 
empirically there are changes in the number and types of incidents observed from year to 
year, even if the total traffic/ATC environment were to be exactly the same. There will be 
a variation in the number and characteristics of initiating factors, and in the relative 
orientation and timings of the aircraft flightpaths concerned. If there were to be a near-
repeat of an incident’s characteristics, there would still be variations in how the controller 
and pilot involved, aided by colleagues and the alerting systems, would handle such an 
occurrence. This means that the parameters for CE in Figure 2 should actually be 
interpreted as statistical variables from underlying probability distributions: thus, the 
number of incidents NES of severity S would vary even for the same total traffic and a 
constant ATC environment.  
 
 Figure 3. Simplified controller and pilot processes to prevent mid-air collisions 
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To represent variations in observed incidents, a simple characterisation of 
incidents is into Circumstances and Performance:  
‘Circumstances’ describes the differences in the initiating event and flightpaths 
that lead to a breach of separation. Circumstances covers variations in the physical 
parameters, such as take-off time and entry to an airspace sector.  
‘Performance’ is what the system defences of Figure 3 do about those 
Circumstances. Performance covers variation of humans and equipment in 
generating, detecting, and resolving the problem.  
Thus, the incident data provides a particular set of Circumstances followed by a particular 
set of Performance actions dependent on those particular Circumstances. Incident data – 
notably the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) between the aircraft – generally correspond 
to some kind of intervention.  
 
As regards predicting next year’s incidents and the probability of an actual 
accident, the modelling difficulty is that both the Circumstances and the Performance are 
essentially samples from an unknown statistical distribution. This distribution 
corresponds to the coming year’s traffic volume and general pattern repeated many, many 
times, with all the variations of real life, producing different incidents and accidents, both 
in terms of Circumstances and Performance. What are the general characteristics of the 
frequency distribution – and is knowing something about them actually helpful? 
 
The first step is to simplify incident CPA descriptions by using a method 
previously introduced in studying Airproxes, STCA and ACAS (Brooker, 2005). Define 
H (Nm) and V (feet) to be the miss distances at the CPA. From Airprox data, H and V 
appear to be statistically independent variables, i.e. high values of one are not associated 
with either high or low values of the other. This offers the opportunity of combining the 
H and V values – a single indicator of close proximity is much easier to deal with 
analytically than a two-dimensional array. What should be the relative weightings in such 
a combination?  
 
The simplest thing is to assume that the weighting should be based on the 
proportional deviation from the separation minimum, and to use terminal airspace criteria 
(because the great majority of Airproxes occur in TMAs). Thus, as the horizontal 
minimum is 3 Nm and the vertical minimum is 1000 feet, a 1 Nm horizontal CPA can be 
taken to be equivalent to 333 feet CPA. The simplest combination of the weighted H and 
V is just to add them together, i.e.:  
CPI = ( 333 x H ) + V 
Here CPI stands for Close Proximity Indicator. There are obviously variants on this: for 
example, the H value of en route incidents could be scaled down by the ratio 3 to 5, to 
reflect the difference in minima. 
 
It cannot be emphasized enough that the CPA parameters and the CPI value are 
measured after intervention. The CPI does not provide information on how close the 
aircraft would have been had there been no intervention or a ‘standard intervention’.  
  
Figure 4. Schematic frequency distribution for CPIs  
 
Figure 4 is a schematic picture – note the non-linear scale – of the unknown 
frequency distribution describing the proportion of incidents with a particular CPI value – 
the x-axis. The actual number of incidents in a particular ‘constant traffic’ year will be 
sampled from some other kind of distribution, probably more Gaussian in shape. The 
distribution in Figure 4 is a very long-term average, i.e. would be observed over a very 
long period of operation of the current year’s traffic, repeating the year almost endlessly. 
Why should the distribution have this kind of shape?  
 
Why is the distribution drawn as monotonic increasing? The empirical reason is 
that data such as Airproxes do show this form: smaller CPI values are less likely than 
larger ones. In abstract terms, potentially small CPI values can be detected by the 
controller, STCA, the pilot, and ACAS; so there will be strong safety defences in place to 
prevent them occurring. Remember also that the CPI can be viewed in terms of the 
deviation from the separation minima. 
 
Why is the region from origin to xC flat and marked as ‘Random Distances’? This 
is because these small CPIs will represent incidents in which ‘system control’ has been 
largely lost. The relative distances between the aircraft when they pass will be a function 
of the chance orientations of their flightpaths, even if modified by ATC. For such an 
occurrence, is there any reason to believe that a CPI of 100 feet is more or less likely than 
one of 200 feet or 300 feet? 
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Formally, the phrase ‘system control’ in Figure 4 is intended to mean something 
like: 
‘System control’ – the ability to determine the outcome against reasonably 
foreseen changes and variations of system parameters, such as the abilities of the 
participant(s), the environment (in the largest sense), and the safety mechanisms 
in place. 
So where exactly does the flat region start to turn upwards? This is a very difficult 
question to answer, because it is essentially asking about the degree of control that a 
controller or pilot has about the flightpaths of aircraft.  
 
What is the ‘Collision Occurs’ region? This represents the CPI values that are less 
than the aircraft dimensions. Thus, these CPI values are collisions not incidents. The key 
fact about the frequency distribution is that the flat shape near the origin, which includes 
collisions, cannot simply be extrapolated from the increasing section of the curve – note 
again the logarithmic scale. Simple extrapolations from the observed part of the CPI 
distribution are likely to be very cautious – e.g. see Brooker (2005). Knowledge of the 
distribution of CPIs for regions where there is a substantial degree of system control 
cannot then be extrapolated with great confidence to estimate the shape – more 
importantly the height – of the curve f(x) in the ‘Random Distances’ region. To be useful 
in estimating f(x) for x values near zero, i.e. to provide evidence about the flat section of 
the curve, it would be necessary to eliminate incidents from consideration that had any 
degree of system control. These kinds of arguments return to the discussion earlier, i.e. 
that the best estimates of the rate of critical events are likely to be made from indicators 
that are very near to those events and which differ from them largely through geometrical 
factors. 
 
Does Figure 4 show the full structure of incidents? No, it does not: the full picture 
cannot be mapped onto a simple two-dimensional diagram. The degree of system control 
tends to be higher for the higher CPI values, but there is not a one-to-one relationship. 
Incidents with the same CPI value can represent widely differing degrees of system 
control: thus, a large CPI value might merely indicate that the aircraft were on widely 
separated flightpaths rather than being the consequence of a swift control action to keep 
them apart.  
 
 
6. Incident Reporting 
Incident reporting is a very large subject, and there are many possible ways of 
classifying incident reports. For present purposes, a division into three schemes is useful:  
Individual reporting means an operational person detects something that is 
unsatisfactory in safety terms and reports this to a central monitoring body. The 
likelihood of someone reporting an incident very much reflects the ATC 
provider’s organisational safety culture.  
Event-related reporting is triggered by automatic system warnings or alerts. The 
main examples are STCA and ACAS – other systems are in use for different 
phases of flight, e.g. Ground Proximity Warning Systems.  
In Post-processed reporting, radar and related data are examined some time after 
actual operations, to determine if (e.g.) separation minima have been significantly 
breached (e.g. the UK’s Separation Monitoring Function – SMF).  
The combination of all the data from these three varieties of incident reporting system, 
enhanced by the pilot/controller recollections and other data (e.g. communication 
recordings), mean that a good picture can usually be obtained of the nature of any 
incident in controlled airspace. The exceptions are where there are equipment failures – 
this is very rare for UK Airproxes.  
 
A reasonable ATC indicator must indicate something about ATC safety or the 
performance of the ATC system’s safety defences. For a collision to occur, there must 
have been: 
separation breach – the aircraft was not flying to a safe plan or the plan was not in 
fact safe; 
failed or non-existent intervention(s) to remedy, even with assistance from 
colleagues and warning systems; 
the ‘right’ (post any intervention) flightpaths: traffic density, route/airspace 
construction are factors. 
 
There are two obvious places for safety defence indicators in Figure 3, indicated 
by the symbols  and . The first covers initiating events that produce a separation 
breach, and the second covers situations where the ground-based part of the system, i.e. 
ATC, has not resolved an incident. The first indicator, at about  in Figure 3, counts 
‘Actual Separation Breaches’ – ASB. The second indicator, at about  in Figure 3 counts 
‘Incident Not Resolved by ATC’ (INRA). Remembering an earlier comment, a key point 
in favour of INRA is that it represents a definite ‘severity’ benchmark, because it focuses 
on incidents in which the ground ATC defences have been ‘used up’.  
 
There are of course many other potential indicators, but these two represent 
decisive points in the safety defences, are very simple to understand, and can be 
measured reasonably consistently. This is because they correspond to measurable events 
or system states, rather than complex judgemental assessments of what might have taken 
place, i.e. judgements about severity. To find another simple indicator of specific severity 
in the flow chart between  and  is extremely difficult, given the variability and 
complexity of what can happen when ATC’s defensive mechanisms restore full system 
control (e.g. see Spouge and Perrin (2005), SRC (2005a)). .  
 
ASB and INRA need definitions covering both typical and ‘pathological’ cases: 
e.g.: 
Actual Separation Breach This counts post-processed incidents that breached the 
appropriate separation minimum. It excludes incidents for which the breach was 
‘small’, e.g. a 2.8 Nm horizontal closest approach when the minimum is 3 Nm. It 
might also exclude situations which ATC management declare to be ‘acceptably 
safe’, e.g. a special operating procedure that breaches a minimum slightly, to cope 
with tight airspace constraints in the terminal area. But such exceptions must be 
documented in the ATC unit safety case or similar document.  
Incident Not Resolved by ATC A count of Individual and/or Event-related reports 
in which the ground-based part of the system, i.e. ATC, has not resolved an 
incident. Was an ACAS Resolution Advisory (RA) then necessary to resolve the 
incident safely? The simplest incidents to count in this category are those in which 
an ACAS RA is deemed by ATC to be ‘justified’. But note – and this example 
shows the care needed – that if the incident were so very short-term that an RA 
was not generated, e.g. a very rapid descent to a small closest point of approach, 
then that obviously would have to be included under this heading. 
Thus, the second indicator does require an assessment to be made by expert 
controllers, that the pilot action following the RA is justified. But it is an assessment 
which is restricted to the kinds of things that controllers actually experience, rather than 
an extrapolation beyond that. The current low reporting rate of this judgement is of 
serious concern, and so will in any case need to be tackled as a part of continuing efforts 
to improve European safety culture. To resolve the issues about safety culture in States, a 
specialist European body could be set up – based on successful State-based ‘peer review’ 
models for incident assessment. 
 
ASBs provide an indication if the rate of ‘initiating events’ is changing. ASBs are 
in fact used by the Eurocontrol Safety Regulation Commission [SRC], although it is not 
obvious from its reports if some ‘acceptable’ varieties of separation infringement are 
filtered from the counting (SRC, 2005b)  
 
The ratio of the counts INRA to ASB is a measure of the effectiveness of the 
ground ATC system in resolving initiating events. An improvement in this ratio would 
therefore demonstrate an improvement in ground-based ATC.  
 
 There are good grounds for believing that INRA would be a good indicator of the 
underlying collision rate, because the INRA would be scaled down by the proportion of 
ACAS RAs that did not successfully resolve the situation. In other words, that scaling-
down would not be strongly dependent on the nature of the State’s ground ATC operation 
and airspace structures. Thus, the value of FES in Figure 2 would not be strongly 
dependent on which State E was being examined.  
 
 
7. Indicator Data and Risk Estimates  
From the argument in the previous Section, it appears that the simplest indicator 
of collision risk would need to use data from incidents in the ‘Random Distances’ region. 
Leaving aside for the moment how one might identify the extent of this region, how 
could an estimate of collision be made from such data? 
 
 Figure 5. Five Year’s actual frequency distribution for CPIs 
(From Brooker (2005): UK Airprox involving CAT aircraft, with STCA and ACAS 
indications, 1999 - 2003 inclusive) 
 
Figure 5 shows a real-life frequency distribution histogram of Airprox incidents 
recorded in UK airspace. [Note that the vertical scale here is linear not logarithmic.] This 
data is taken from Brooker (2005). It covers five years from 1999 to 2003. In this data set 
there were 29 incidents with CPI < 1000, of which one could well have had a CPI small 
enough to fall into the ‘Random Distances’ region. That incident was Airprox 2001/052, 
in which a pilot took a wrong instruction to descend, which was undetected by ATC 
because of simultaneous transmissions; its aircrew then ignored RA and used ‘visual’ 
avoidance action. The aircraft in this incident were surely ‘at best’ on the borderline of 
system control.  
 
What would be a possible cut-off value for the ‘Random Distances’ region of xC? 
It might be derived from an analysis of many incidents, or it might be chosen by safety 
managers/regulators as a standard value. For illustration, assume it is 500 feet. The CPI 
value for the size of an aircraft might be of the order of 50 feet. As f(x) is a flat 
distribution for values up to xC, this implies that the CPIs for incidents within the range 
zero to xC are equally probable. Thus, the probability of a CPI value falling within the 
‘Collision Occurs’ region would be approximately 50, the aircraft dimension, divided by 
500, the size of the ‘Random Distances’ region, i.e. 1/10. If it were believed that the risk 
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of a collision is constant, and there have been (say) ten years without any other incidents 
in the ‘Random Distances’ region, then the probability of a collision in the next year 
would be estimated about 1/100. 
 
Whilst well founded in statistical and modelling terms, this Random Distances 
Estimate (RDE) is a disappointing calculation. The collision probability cannot be 
calculated without several years’ data, and this data will be subject to the typical large 
fluctuations to be expected from Poisson-distributed events. How is one to know 
quantitatively if the system is ‘safe’ now (i.e. for the next year), and if it is getting safer 
or less safe? 
 
In an ideal world, the form of f(x) would be known on a yearly basis. Consider 
Figure 6 (based on Figure 4, but with a magnified vertical scale). The Figure shows two 
possible curves A and B, one of which might be the correct form for f(x) in a particular 
year. Estimating collision risk essentially means estimating the intercept on the vertical 
axis. Could this be done by measuring the size of the curve at some x-axis distance 
markedly above the value xC, e.g. at xI – where system control is weak but not wholly 
absent, thus benefiting from the accumulation of considerably more incident data? While 
it might not be possible to prove that the absolute estimate of the intercept was perfectly 
accurate, it might potentially be a very helpful way of monitoring relative collision risk. 
In other words, would a count of the annual frequency of small and medium-sized CPI 
values lead to a good indicator of collision risk in each year?  
 
 
Figure 6. Possible frequency distribution for CPIs plus Accident/Incident components 
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references on necessary and sufficient conditions). Each one of this set of causal factors, 
using the phrase loosely, can have a set of parameters associated with it. Thus, there 
could be a set of broadly similar incidents involving aircraft on converging routes; but 
some of them might be two commercial aircraft, whilst others would involve two 
executive jets, so that the speeds and climb performances would be different.  
 
Figure 6 shows two incident Types that contribute to curve A, marked I and II. 
The curve will be made up of a large number of different incident Types. Every observed 
incident is a sample from all the ‘similar’ items, i.e. from that incident Type’s probability 
distribution. Type I incidents are those in which, for some rare combinations of 
parameters, correspond to loss of system control; which implies that very small CPI 
values – less than xC – can occur, and hence there is a risk of collision. Hence, Type Is 
have collision potential. In contrast, incident Type II can never lead to a collision: there is 
always some system control and CPI values never get as low as xC. Hence, Type IIs have 
no collision potential. An examination of Airproxes shows that the bulk of them probably 
fall into this second category: separation has been lost for some reason, but is then 
restored through normal processes; that being one of the characteristics of that incident 
Type. Thus, no reasonable combination of parameters could produce a collision for this 
specific variety of incident.  
 
Of course, an additional contributory factor could be seen as turning a Type II 
incident into one with collision risk potential; but this extra factor would then mean that 
the incident should be categorised in another (Type I) family. Data on Type II incidents 
does have safety (i.e. collision risk) value if the probability of such additional 
contributory factors can be estimated in some way. But this is leading to complex risk 
modelling rather than the creation of simple ATC safety indicators. 
 
On what basis would the curve A and B values, measured at xI, i.e. the points A 
and B, be a good estimate of the relative y-axis intercepts of the two curves? Do the 
curves have the same shape? A thought experiment shows this is a hard question. Do 
curves such as A and B retain their shape for increased traffic volumes, given exactly the 
same ATC system, controllers, pilots etc? Suppose traffic numbers increase by a factor k, 
but that all strategic traffic patterns over time and space remain the same. A given aircraft 
will encounter k times as many aircraft and hence potentially k times as many incidents. 
Thus, the total number of incidents will be expected to increase by a factor k2. So will the 
collision risk and the number count for CPI = xI both increase by a factor of k2? They 
might do – but they might not. A simple confounding element could be that, with an 
increased traffic volume, more ATC sectors would be ‘above capacity’ for short periods. 
This could increase the likelihood that controllers might be distracted and hence not 
remember that particular aircraft flightpaths had to be revised on their progress through 
the sector (e.g. see Loft et al (2004)). This could increase the number of Type I incidents 
in comparison to Type II incidents, i.e. increase the likelihood of incidents with collision 
potential. This kind of change would mean that curves such as A and B would have 
different shapes for increased traffic levels, rather than being simply scaled-up. The 
values A and B would not therefore be in proportion to the y-axis intercepts.  
 
 The fact that something might happen does not mean that it occurs in practice. It 
might be that the value at xI is generally a good estimate of relative collision risk. Two 
factors that might make it so are: 
• that Type II incidents are systematically excluded in this calculation – because 
they are in themselves irrelevant to collision risk and cloud the Type I incident 
picture; 
• that xI is not too far from xC – because the further the extrapolation from xC the 
less reliable will be any quantitative predictions. 
 
 ATC Incidents can be categorised in other ways. One example is the risk-bearing 
categories for Airproxes (UKAB, 2006). Another is the ‘risk of collision/severity’ scores 
proposed by the SRC (2005a). . The first has gaps, because it (intentionally) does not 
consider variations in circumstances compared the observed incident. The second is more 
promising conceptually, but the existing scoring system has not been demonstrated to 
have the properties necessary to match the underlying risk level. Details of this analysis 
are set out in Brooker (2007a). 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
ATC in developed European countries is extremely safe. The drawback to this 
safety record is that it is very difficult to estimate what the ‘underlying’ accident rate for 
mid-air collisions is now, or to detect changes over time. The rate cannot be observed 
directly. Is it possible to construct simple ATC safety indicators that correlate with this 
underlying accident rate, to indicate whether safety targets are being met and/or if safety 
is improving?  
 
Can ATC safety indicators be constructed from the performance of ATC safety 
defences? Two are examined. The first counts initiating events that produce a separation 
breach and the second covers situations where the ground based part of the system, i.e. 
ATC, has not resolved an incident. The first indicator is a count of what is termed here an 
‘Actual Separation Breach’ – ASB. The second indicator counts ‘Incident Not Resolved 
by ATC’ – INRA: this focuses on incidents in which the ground ATC defences have been 
‘used up’.  
 
An important concept here is that of ‘system control’: the ability to determine the 
outcome against reasonably foreseen changes and variations of system parameters. ASBs 
are a useful measure for the frequency of initiating events for incidents, i.e. where full 
system control needs to be re-asserted. The statistical distribution of incidents has been 
examined by focusing on an index – the CPI – of separation at the Closest Point of 
Approach. INRAs measure the number of times when safety is reliant on its final safety 
defensive layer, ACAS. There are good grounds for believing that INRA would be a good 
indicator of the underlying accident rate. This is because, by definition, these events are 
deemed ‘justified’ by controllers (and hence should generally be incidents with collision 
potential); have low CPI values; and reduced levels of system control. However, issues 
about European safety culture in reporting incidents need to be addressed, and/or a 
specialist UKAB-like body might be need to ensure complete coverage of such incidents. 
 
The key methodological question is: if someone says he or she knows how to 
make a good estimate of the underlying accident rate, then how could this claim be 
tested? In particular, if it correlates very well with INRA counts, then what would be the 
nature of any quantitative argument for saying that it is in fact a 'better' indicator? 
 
Indicators are valuable things to have – and it is very important to have systems 
that collect comprehensive data on incidents – but they are not in themselves solutions to 
safety problems. Accident rates will decease because organisations and the people in 
them understand the causes of the full range of potential accidents, and can think of ways 
of reducing the frequency of or eliminating these causes. Voltaire said “Le mieux est 
l'ennemi du bien” – “The best is the enemy of the good”. So: identify good, simple 
indicators, based on significant kinds of events or states of system control, and focus 
effort and resources on trying to ensure that automatic systems are in place and reporting 
rates are high. 
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